

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: SUPPLEMENTARY HIGHLIGHTS, POST-PLenary DISCUSSIONS,
NOVEMBER 2, 1976 (SALT TWO-1139)

(ALLEN-FREW-MARSHALL/PAVLITCHENKO-JOURAVLEV)

A. MIRV VERIFICATION

PAVLITCHENKO ASKED IF THESE "FEATURES" (MENTIONED IN
AMB. JOHNSON'S STATEMENT) HAD PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR
THE AMBASSADOR'S REMARK THAT THE U.S. HAD IDENTIFIED 60
SS-19 LAUNCHERS AT D&P. DRAWING A BAR GRAPH REPRESENTING
ALL OF THE LAUNCHERS AT D&P, ALLEN INDICATED THAT CONSTRU-
TION OF ONE-THIRD OF THESE -- 60 -- HAD BEGUN IN 1970; THEY
WERE A NEW TYPE OF LAUNCHER -- ONE WHICH WE ASSOCIATE WITH
THE SS-19. WE HAD CONCLUDED THAT THESE LAUNCHERS CONTAINED UN-
MIRV'ED MISSILES BECAUSE THE LAUNCHERS WERE COMPLETED BEFORE
THE SS-19 WAS READY FOR DEPLOYMENT. THE OTHER LAUNCHERS
AT D&P WERE LATER CONVERTED TO THE SAME TYPE, I.E., THAT
WHICH WE ASSOCIATE WITH THE SS-19. NEAR SOME OF THE CON-
VERTED LAUNCHERS, WE HAVE OBSERVED FEATURES THAT ARE NOT

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PRESENT NEAR OTHER LAUNCHERS. PAVLITCHENKO ASKED WHETHER

BY "SOME" LAUNCHERS ALLEN MEANT THAT THESE FEATURES WERE ASSOCIATED WITH "LESS THAN A MAJORITY" OF THE CONVERTED LAUNCHERS. ALLEN AFFIRMED THAT POINT. ALLEN REPEATED THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF THESE FEATURES INDICATED A MIRV CAPABILITY OR A LACK THEREOF. PAVLITCHENKO SAID THAT THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MIRV AND NON-MIRV LAUNCHERS SHOULD BE BASED ON A NUMBER OF THINGS, THE MOST IMPORTANT OF WHICH IS THE TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES, THAT IS, THE KIND OF MISSILE TESTED FROM A LAUNCHER, AND THE KIND OF MISSILES DEPLOYED IN SUCH LAUNCHERS. HE SAID TESTING SHOULD BE WATCHED, AND CONVERSION OF LAUNCHERS SHOULD BE WATCHED. PAVLITCHENKO SAID HE AND JOURAVLEV WOULD STUDY WHAT ALLEN HAD SAID, AND THAT WE COULD CONTINUE OUR DISCUSSION OF DERAZHNYA AND PERVOMAYSK SOME OTHER TIME.

NOTING PAVLITCHENKO'S REMARK THAT IT WOULD BE FOOLISH TO PUT UN-MIRV'ED MISSILES INTO MIRV LAUNCHERS, ALLEN OBSERVED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ADMITTED TO DOING JUST THAT. IN THE U.S. VIEW, ALL LAUNCHERS AT DERAZHNYA AND PERVOMAYSK APPEAR TO BE SS-19 LAUNCHERS, YET MINISTER SEMENOV HAD SAID THAT MOST OF THEM CONTAIN UN-MIRV'ED MISSILES. PAVLITCHENKO REPLIED THAT THE LAUNCHERS THERE WERE NOT ALL THE SAME. THE DEPLOYMENT OF MIRV'ED MISSILES IS THE KEY. THE LAUNCHERS AT D&P WHICH THE U.S. SAYS WERE "CONVERTED" WERE NOT "CONVERTED" FOR MIRV'ED MISSILES IN THE SENSE OF PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE VI. THE WORK THAT WAS DONE ON THOSE LAUNCHERS WAS DONE FOR SOME OTHER PURPOSE. BEFORE THOSE LAUNCHERS COULD BECOME MIRV LAUNCHERS, FURTHER CONVERSION WOULD BE REQUIRED, AND THIS WOULD BE OBSERVED BY NTM. ALLEN ASKED IF PAVLITCHENKO WAS SAYING THAT ONE OF THE LAUNCHERS AT D&P WHICH WE DESCRIBE AS "CONVERTED" CONTAINED MIRV'ED MISSILES. PAVLITCHENKO AND JOURAVLEV ASSENTED. ALLEN ASKED WHETHER HE COULD INFER FROM THAT THAT ONLY THE 60 LAUNCHERS WHOSE CONSTRUCTION STARTED IN 1970 CONTAINED MIRV'ED MISSILES. PAVLITCHENKO AND JOURAVLEV ASSENTED. ALLEN NOTED THAT THESE LAUNCHERS LOOKED THE SAME AS SOME OF THE "CONVERTED" LAUNCHERS, AND THAT THEY LACKED THE "FEATURES" WHICH HAD BEEN NOTED AT OTHERS OF THE "CONVERTED" LAUNCHERS. PAVLITCHENKO SAID IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO CONCENTRATE ON ADDITIONAL "FEATURES", THAT IT WAS THE COMBINATION OF TWO FACTORS WHICH WAS ESSENTIAL -- WHAT TYPE OF MISSILE HAD

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BEEN TESTED FROM A LAUNCHER, AND WHAT TYPE OF MISSILE WAS DEPLOYED. PAVLITCHENKO ASKED HOW IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN CLAIRIFYING THEIR DISCUSSION FOR THE SOVIETS TO GIVE US THE PRECISE NUMBER OF MIRV'ED LAUNCHERS AT D&P. FREW SAID THAT KNOWING THE PRECISE NUMBER WOULD HELP US ESTABLISH THE SCOPE OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US, AND WOULD ALSO HELP US TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE SAME PROBLEM MIGHT EXIST IN OTHER REGIONS.

B. MIRV LAUNCHER CONVERSION

FREW ASKED PAVLITCHENKO IF THE U.S. SHOULD INTERPRET THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR PARAGRAPH 5 OF ARTICLE II TO MEAN THAT (1) AN ICBM OR SLBM LAUNCHER WOULD BE IDENTIFIED AS A MIRV LAUNCHER (OR A FUTURE MIRV LAUNCHER) BASED ON THE FACT THAT IT IS DETERMINED (E.G., DURING THE CONVERSION PROCESS) TO BE THE SAME AS A LAUNCHER WHICH HAS BEEN TESTED WITH A MIRV'ED MISSILE AND (2) THAT THE LAUNCHER WOULD BEGIN TO COUNT IN THE 1,320 AGGREGATE ONLY AFTER A MISSILE HAD BEEN DEPLOYED IN IT. PAVLITCHENKO ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. FREW ASKED IF IT WOULD COUNT IN A NON-MIRV'ED MISSILE WERE DEPLOYED IN IT. PAVLITCHENKO SAID THAT IT WOULD BE FOOLISH TO SPEND ALL THAT MONEY TO BUILD A MIRV LAUNCHER AND THEN DEPLOY A NON-MIRV'ED MISSILE IN IT. HE SAID THAT ALL MIRV LAUNCHERS WOULD HAVE MIRV'ED MISSILES IN THEM. FREW THEN ASKED IF, HAVING IDENTIFIED A LAUNCHER AS A MIRV (OR FUTURE MIRV) LAUNCHER BASED ON THE "SAME AS" CRITERIA, IT COULD BE CONCLUDED THAT A MIRV'ED MISSILE HAD BEEN DEPLOYED IN THE LAUNCHER UPON COMPLETION OF THE CONSTRUCTION OR CONVERSION PROCESS WITHOUT ACTUALLY OBSERVING THE EMPLACEMENT OF A MIRV'ED MISSILE. PAVLITCHENKO AGAIN ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, ADDING THAT DEPLOYMENT IS A "PROCEDURAL" ACT THAT TAKES PLACE OVER TIME AND THAT THE POINT IN THE PROCESS AT WHICH A LAUNCHER WILL BEGIN TO COUNT IN THE 1320 LIMIT WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE SCC (REF SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR VI.3). HE GAVE AS AN EXAMPLE THE SIGHTING OF A MISSILE TRANSPORTED IN THE VICINITY OF THE LAUNCHER. FREW ASKED IF IT WOULD BE CORRECT THEN TO SAY THAT THE SIDE WOULD NOT ACTUALLY HAVE TO OBSERVE THAT A MIRV'ED MISSILE HAD BEEN DEPLOYED IN A PARTICULAR LAUNCHER TO ESTABLISH THE "FACT OF DEPLOYMENT." PAVLITCHENKO AGAIN ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE.

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ACTION SS-25

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C. ICBM LAUNCHER CONVERSION

PAVLITCHENKO STATED THAT WITH REGARD TO TESTING A LAUNCHER IN BOTH AN ICBM AND SOME NON-ICBM CAPACITY, YOU COULD NOT DEPLOY BEGIN BRACKETS FIXED END BRACKETS LAUNCHERS WHICH HAD BEEN TESTED IN SUCH DUAL CAPACITY BECAUSE SUCH ACTION WOULD CONSTITUTE CONSTRUCTION OF ADDITIONAL FIXED ICBM LAUNCHERS.

MARSHALL THEN STATED TO PAVLITCHENKO THAT SINCE IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE NEW AGREEMENT TO PROPERLY COVER SITUATIONS WHICH MIGHT ARISE IN THE FUTURE WHILE THE AGREEMENT WAS IN EFFECT, IT WAS RELEVANT TO CONSIDER SUCH POSSIBILITIES WHICH MIGHT ONLY BE HYPOTHETICAL AT THE MOMENT, AND HE AGAIN ASKED PAVLITCHENKO IF HE BELIEVED THAT IF THE SAME LAUNCHER WERE TESTED WITH BOTH ICBM'S AND IRBM'S AND THEN DEPLOYED WITH IRBM'S, WOULD SUCH LAUNCHERS NOT PROPERLY BE CONSIDERED AS ICBM LAUNCHERS PRUSUANT TO THE TERMS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. PAVLITCHENKO CONFERRED WITH JOURAVLEV AND SAID THAT SUCH LAUNCHERS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE NEW AGREEMENT. MARSHALL THEN ASKED PAVLITCHENKO IF HE MEANT THAT SUCH LAUNCHERS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT GOVERNING ICBM'S, TO WHICH PAVLITCHENKO NODDED
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AFFIRMATIVELY AND REPLIED YES, THEY WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE ICBM LAUNCHER PROVISIONS. JOHNSON

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